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Abstract
This Article focuses on the role of the private sector in fighting corruption. It argues that
it is necessary for the private sector to take a more active role in creating meaningful deterrents
to international bribery. Part I of the Article offers background on the concept and extent of
corruption in general, and bribery in particular. Part II examines the existing U.S. and international
legal framework for combating the payment of bribes abroad. Part III looks at non-State actors
who may lead implementation efforts in the future.
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INTRODUCTION
Corruption exists in all countries,1 and its deleterious im-
pact is clear: "[C]orruption distorts markets and competition,
breeds cynicism among citizens, undermines the rule of law,
damages government legitimacy, and corrodes the integrity of
the private sector. It is also a major barrier to international de-
velopment-systemic misappropriation by kleptocratic govern-
ments harms the poor."2 The World Bank estimates the global
cost of corruption at $1,000,000,000,000 per year.' Corruption
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1. While corruption is universal, the forms it takes and the attitudes towards it vary.
Nonetheless, there is not a single country in the world that explicitly permits the pay-
ment of large-scale bribes. For a discussion of cultural differences in tolerance of cor-
ruption, see JOHN HOOKER, WORKING ACROSS CULTURES 88, 204, 317 (2003).
2. Ben W. Heineman, Jr. & Fritz Heimann, The Long War Against Corruption, 85
FOREIGN AFF., May/June 2006, at 75, 76.
3. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL MONITORING REPORT 2006, 171 (2006), http://
web.worldbank.org/external/default/main?theSitePK=2186432&pagePK=64218950&
contentMDK=20810084&menuPK= 2199415&piPK=64218883 (last visited Nov. 9,
2006). It is difficult, if not impossible, to get any precise figure. When examining such
assertions, one should keep in mind that corrupt individuals do not report their ac-
tions, nor is there universal agreement on what constitutes corruption. In theory, cor-
ruption bribery may be measured by the amount of the bribe paid or favor rendered. It
also may be analyzed within the context of its costs, not all of which can be quantified.
In some circumstances, corruption operates as a tax, increasing the cost of goods and
government services. Corruption in the extreme may deprive a government of the fi-
nancial resources to render necessary services to the individuals living in the territories
it purports to rule. Furthermore, corruption has a corrosive and multiplicative effect-
why comply with relevant laws and regulations if others are not and are benefiting from
their conduct? If corruption exists at the highest levels in government and the private
sector, it is almost certain to be present at lower levels. See generally Ethan S. Burger,
Thinking About Corruption (2005), http://www.american.edu/traccc/resources/pub-
lications/burger07.pdf (last visited Sept. 30, 2006) (unpublished paper); World Bank
Governance and Anti-Corruption Website, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EX-
TERNAL/WBI/EXTWBIGOVANTCOR/0,,menuPK: 1740542-pagePK:64168427-piPK:
64168435-theSitePKl1740530,00.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006) (providing research on
the topics of governance and anti-corruption).
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includes the misuse of public office for personal gain, bribery,
extortion, and other misappropriations of public and private as-
sets.4
Despite anticorruption norms and global attention, how-
ever, corruption thrives; and globalization has created vast new
opportunities for it. While global norms have set valuable
benchmarks to prohibit bribery, there has been relatively little
prosecution for bribery of foreign officials in any country. Prose-
cution under the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA"),
the oldest and one of the strictest anticorruption statutes, has
been minimal, though the number of cases examined by U.S.
law enforcement and regulatory authorities has increased in re-
cent years. Contemporary empirical work suggests that the
FCPA contains significant loopholes in practice.5 In its most re-
cent review of the enforcement of the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development's ("OECD") Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions ("OECD Convention"), Transparency Interna-
tional notes that "there is as yet little or no enforcement in al-
most 2/3 of the countries covered."6 It concludes that, "[a] t pre-
sent limited levels of enforcement, much of the international
community is not yet convinced that foreign bribery laws must
be obeyed."7
There is a huge "impunity gap" with respect to international
corrupt practices. The potential financial rewards for bribes are
great, while the likelihood of detection, investigation, and prose-
4. See U.S. Agency for International Development Website, http://www.usaid.gov/
our.work/democracyandgovemance/technical_areas/anti-corruption (last visited
May 4, 2006) (describing programmatic and research work in the anticorruption area);
United Nations ("UN") Office on Drugs and Crime Website, http://www.unodc.org/
unodc/en/corruption.html (last visited May 4, 2006) (discussing anticorruption initia-
tives).
5. See Theodore H. Moran, How Multinational Investors Evade Developed Country Laws
8-9 (Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 79), available at http://www.cgdev.org/
files/6113_file.WP79.pdf (explaining how law firms give opinion letters exposing For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act ("FCPA") and Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") loopholes to
stimulate evasion).
6. FRrrz HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, 2006 TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL PROGRESS
REPORT: ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN
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cution remains remote. There are indications that the size of
the impunity gap may be undergoing some change, but without
knowing the number of transgressions, an increase of official in-
vestigations does not guarantee that a higher percentage of
wrongful acts is being detected and punished. Furthermore,
even if the payment of a bribe is punished, the severity of the
punishment may be insufficient to have a deterrent effect.
Government law enforcement will always have competing
priorities, whether combating terrorism, the drug trade, organ-
ized crime, or other domestic objectives; and governments are
not unitary actors. They are typically divided into ministries or
agencies that sometimes have inconsistent priorities. In addi-
tion, there can be divergences among national, regional, and lo-
cal governments. Therefore, it should not be surprising that
governments have inherently mixed motives in combating bribes
to their own government officials. Many government officials in
developed countries seemingly take an attitude of "benign neg-
lect" towards major national corporations and campaign donors
that pay foreign bribes. Raymond Baker and Moises Naim make
a strong case that mass corruption could not exist without the
collusion of legitimate accountants, banks, lawyers, and govern-
ment officials.' They believe that many governments lack the
political will to effectively fight corruption, in part since the gov-
ernments, their corporations, and citizens benefit from the pre-
sent system. It is thus quite understandable that governments
would have achieved enormously more progress on paper than
in actual enforcement.
This Article focuses on the role of the private sector in fight-
ing corruption. It is unrealistic to expect that national criminal
prosecutions alone will ever deter corrupt actors sufficiently to
reduce the rewards of corrupt behavior while increasing the risks
of detection.9 Thus, it is necessary for the private sector to take a
more active role in creating meaningful deterrents to interna-
8. See generally RAYMOND W. BAKER, CAPITALISM'S ACHILLES HEEL: DIRTY MONEY AND
How TO RENEW THE FREE MARKET SYSTEM (2005); MOISES NAIM, ILLICIT: How SMUG-
GLERS, TRAFFICKERS AND COPYCATS ARE HIJACKING THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (2005); see also
Ethan S. Burger et al., Tax Avoidance vs. Tax Evasion-Ethical Implications for Lawyers and
Accountants: The Strange Case of KPMG, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. (forthcoming 2006) (discuss-
ing KPMG's role in facilitating the use of abuse tax shelters and the U.S. government's
legislative and regulatory response).
9. See generally BAKER, supra note 8.
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tional bribery. Some for-profit legal entities stand to gain from
better enforcement of anticorruption laws. Thus, they may be
willing to commit resources where they have suffered damages.
Part I offers background on the concept and extent of cor-
ruption in general, and bribery in particular. Part II examines
the existing U.S. and international legal framework for combat-
ing the payment of bribes abroad. It provides background on
the history and operation of the FCPA, which was an impetus for
certain international anticorruption instruments, the OECD
Convention, and more recent anticorruption norms. It discusses
prosecution under this legislation and the view that these norms
are ineffective. Part III looks at non-State actors who may lead
implementation efforts in the future. It examines private corpo-
rations, multilateral development banks ("MDBs"), and non-gov-
ernmental organizations ("NGOs"), and describes several suc-
cessful private claims in the United States against corrupt com-
petitors, and the legal basis for such claims in Germany.
I. DEFINING CORRUPTION AND BRIBERY
Addressing corruption is complex and culturally nuanced.1"
Member States negotiating the United Nations Convention
Against Corruption ("U.N. Convention") could not reach agree-
ment on how to define "corruption," although they defined
other terms." There are significant differences among States in
both their official and day-to-day attitudes concerning what con-
stitutes corruption or unlawful conduct. For example, in some
countries, civil servants are permitted to accept gifts from the
public, treating such "gifts" as a component of their legal in-
come.1 2 These differences, however, have not impeded the de-
10. See Peter J. Henning, Public Corruption: A Comparative Analysis of International
Corruption Conventions and United States Law, 18 ARIz. J. INT'L & COMp. LAw 793 (1981)
(discussing how previously legal U.S. campaign finance practices may be viewed as cor-
rupt by others).
11. See UN Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 9, 2003, S. TREAv Doc. No. 109-
6 [hereinafter U.N. Convention]; see also Ethan S. Burger, The UN. Convention Against
Corruption: Decisive Action or Mere Symbolism?, http://www.american.edu/traccc/re-
sources/publications/glasshouses.pdf (last visited Aug. 6, 2006) (unpublished paper)
(discussing the U.N. Convention).
12. Under the Russian Federation Civil Code, the giving of a "gift" to a state or
municipal official having a value of less than five times the minimum monthly wage (the
equivalent of about $150) is not considered a crime. See Grazhdanskii Kodeks [GK]
[Civil Code] art. 575. Nonetheless, the Russian Criminal Code provides that the pay-
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velopment of multiple, overlapping anticorruption legal
norms.
1 3
Corruption is globally prohibited, at least at the level of
rhetoric and legal norms. The United Nations ("U.N.") and the
OECD have adopted conventions requiring members to enact
laws prohibiting bribery and extortion."4 International organiza-
tions, including the Council of Europe ("COE")"1, the Organiza-
tion of American States ("OAS"), 16 and the World Trade Organi-
zation ("WTO")' 7 have enacted additional conventions and have
sought to increase public awareness of corruption and its conse-
ment and receipt of a bribe in an amount in excess of a "gift" is a crime. See Ugolovnyi
Kodeks [UK] [Criminal Code] arts. 290-91.
13. See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, U.N. Convention Against Corruption,
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/crime_convention-corruption.html (last visited May 4,
2006) (providing the text of the convention, its negotiation history, and related materi-
als).
14. Although the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD") recognizes the broad scope of corruption and its impact on investment and
development, the OECD chose to concentrate its efforts on the adoption of an anti-
bribery convention. See OECD Corruption Website, http://www.oecd.org/topic/
0,2686,en_2649_37447 1 11j1 37447,00.html (last visited May 4, 2006) (discussing
corruption in general); see also Barbara Crutchfield George, Kathleen A. Lacey &Jutta
Birmele, The 1998 OECD Convention: An Impetus for Worldwide Change in Attitudes Toward
Corruption in Business Transactions, 37 Am. Bus. L.J. 485 (2000) (discussing the factors
leading to the preparation of the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions ("OECD Convention") and not-
ing the Creation of the OECD Working Groups to Monitor the Convention's Imple-
mentation); Nikolay A. Ouzounov, Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Capture and the
Role of Multinational Business, 37J. MARSHALL L. Rrv. 1181 (2004) (noting the growing
awareness of the role of international business in facilitating corruption within weak
states and examining how the OECD may be able to reduce this problem).
15. See Civil Law Convention on Corruption, Nov. 4, 1999, EUROP. T.S. No. 174,
available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/174.htm; Criminal
Law Convention on Corruption,Jan. 27, 1999, EuRop. T.S. No. 173, available at http://
conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Treaties/Html/ 1 73.htm.
16. The Council of Europe ("COE") and the Organization of American States
("OAS") both have agreements that address corruption in the transnational context
and within the Member States as well. The COE's website contains the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption and other materials. See COE's Economic Crime Website,
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal-affairs/Legal-co-operation/Combating-economic
crime (last visited May 4, 2006). The OAS website focuses on the Inter-American Con-
vention Against Corruption, but also contains some information about anti-money laun-
dering programs and domestic legislation in the OAS's Member States. See OAS Anti-
Corruption Website, http://www.oas.org/main/main.asp?sLang&sLink=http://www.
oas.org/juridico/english/fightcur.html (last visited May 4, 2006).
17. The World Trade Organization's ("WTO") website does not discuss corruption
per se, but includes documents relating to good governance and information on how to
organize a tender. See WTO Website, http://www.wto.org/english/info e/site2_e.htm
(last visited May 4, 2006).
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quences. Almost all nations have laws against corruption.' 8 De-
velopment banks and corporations have adopted internal codes
of conduct and ethical guidelines.19 Non-governmental watch-
dog groups, such as Transparency International, monitor and re-
port on corruption worldwide."z
Combating corruption is not a simple task; it cannot be re-
solved by adopting legislation alone. Corruption will never be
entirely eradicated; its extent can be reduced, however, by multi-
layered policies. Generally, commentators focus on four main
approaches to limiting corruption: (1) prevention; (2) enforce-
ment; (3) State building; and (4) instilling cultural values that
will reinforce prevention, enforcement, and State building.21
This Article examines the role of bribery in the award of
international contracts for tenders. While international bribes
are a subset of "corruption," they represent a transnational issue
that Nations, international organizations, and corporate entities
must address together beyond the borders of their home coun-
tries. This Article analyzes the environment in which bribes are
paid in connection with international business involving natural
resources,2 2 infrastructure contracts (e.g., power plants or high-
ways), and other major purchases of services or equipment, such
as weapon systems or bulk medical equipment. Since many de-
veloping countries do not have well-established laws or legal cul-
tures for transparency and accountability, it is often difficult to
determine if the State receives a fair share of the revenues or if
governmental officials or private intermediaries are skimming
funds.
The trend in anticorruption conventions to enlarge the role
for private parties to bring civil damage claims against corrupt
actors is encouraging. Both the COE's Civil Law Convention
18. See Henning, supra note 10, at 793 n.2.
19. See Heineman & Heimann, supra note 2, at 115; Sean Murphy, Taking Multina-
tional Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 389, 400
(2005).
20. See Transparency International Website, http://www.transparency.org (last vis-
ited May 4, 2006).
21. See Heineman & Heimann, supra note 2, at 115.
22. See Matthew Nick, Rethinking Multinational Corporate Governance in Extractive In-
dustries: The Caspian Development Project and the Promise of Cooperative Governance, 38 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 577 (2005) (discussing that the Caspian Development Project in many
respects failed to protect the interests of the countries where the exploration and ex-
traction was occurring).
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against Corruption, which entered into force in 2003, and the
U.N. Convention, which entered into force in 2005, create pri-
vate rights of action for victims of corrupt practices. This Article
contends that the shift towards non-governmental civil enforce-
ment mechanisms will improve deterrence against international
bribery.
II. THE NORMA TIVE FRAMEWORK
A. The U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
In 1977, the United States adopted the FCPA to combat,
inter alia, the bribery of non-U.S. government officials by U.S.
legal entities, nationals, and their agents. The FCPA responded
to bribery scandals that had occurred abroad, some of which had
serious foreign policy consequences.2" The FCPA has two com-
ponents: (1) U.S. persons and agents are subject to criminal
sanctions for paying a commercial bribe to a defined group of
foreign persons, even though the relevant actions occurred
abroad, and (2) public corporations are required to disclose ille-
gal payments in their filings with the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission ("SEC") in accordance with the FCPA's so-
called "books and records" provisions. 24 The latter violation is
often easier to prove since there is no need to prove criminal
intent on the part of the corporation's employees or agents.
Since the United States was the only country with such legis-
lation as of 1977, U.S. business and government officials argued
that U.S business was competing at a disadvantage with non-U.S.
competitors in the international marketplace. Working with
NGOs, they were able to promote the adoption of the OECD
Convention to ensure that corporations, employees, and agents
of other OECD nations operated pursuant to rules similar to
23. See generally Daniel Patrick Ashe, The Lengthening Anti-Bribery Lasso of the United
States: The Recent Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73
FoRDHAm L. REv. 2897, 2940-45 (2005). For a thorough discussion of FCPA develop-
ments in recent years, see Oren Gleich & Ryan Woodward, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 545 (2005).
24. See generally Oren Gleich & Ryan Woodward, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 42 AM.
CRIM. L. Rav. 545 (2005) (summarizing the key features of the FCPA and analyzing its
implementation); U.S. Department of Justice FCPA Website, http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa.html (last visited May 4, 2006).
25. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (2000) (mandating that issuers make and keep
books and records).
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those facing U.S. actors. 26
From the FCPA's unanimous enactment by Congress in
1977 until 2005, there have been a paltry number of reported
investigations and prosecutions. From 1995 to 2000, the govern-
ment averaged 0.8 prosecutions per year, and from 2001 to 2005,
it has averaged 3.8 per year. 27 As the Corporate Crime Reporter re-
cently noted, "l[t] he prosecution of foreign bribery has been ane-
mic."2
Since 2001, the U.S. Department ofJustice ("DOJ") and the
SEC have brought significantly more enforcement actions.2 9
Similarly, there are forty ongoing investigations in OECD coun-
tries. These numbers in the overall scheme of things are doubt-
lessly low, but may be the first signs of the trend that began with
the OECD Convention's entry into force in 1999.30 Perhaps as
governments become aware that other governments are taking
their treaty commitments seriously, and that there has been an
increase in capacity in these areas, they will be willing to investi-
gate and prosecute.31
The low number of formal proceedings in the United States
is not an entirely accurate indicator of the practical impact of
the FCPA.3 2 Both the DOJ and the SEC have limited resources
26. The OECD Convention is not directly related to the voluntary 2004 Principles
of Corporate Governance. See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance Website,
http://www.oecd.org/document/56/0,2340,en_2649_34813_31530865_1_1_1_1,00.
html (last visited May 4, 2006).
27. See DANFORTH NEWCOMB, DIGESTS OF CASES AND NEW RELEASES RELATING TO
BRIBES TO FOREIGN OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CoRRuPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, 3
(2006), available at http://www.shearman.com/It.022806.
28. 20 Corporate Crime Reporter, 14(1), Mar. 29, 2006.
29. See generally Worth D. McMurray, Private Sector Response to the Emerging Anticor-
ruption Movement, DEVELOPMENTAL PROC., Sept. 2006, http://wwwl.worldbank.org/
devoutreach/article.asp?id=367 (last visited Sept. 25, 2006).
30. See id.
31. Some governments have a long history of using charges of corruption (with or
without merit) to discredit political opponents. SeeJohn Read, Zuma Corruption Trial to
Hear Claims of Corporate Bribery, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2006, at 12. In this matter, African
National Congress Deputy President Jacob Zuma has been accused of taking large
bribes in connection with a multi-billion dollar tender for the South African Navy. See
id. In the view of many, he had stood a good chance of succeeding President Thabo
Mbeki in 2009. See id.
32. Throughout the world a veritable army of "anticorruption" specialists, both
outside consultants as well as government officials within State bodies, has appeared
over the last decade. There seems to be an industry consisting of conferences, semi-
nars, guides, and management systems. See generally OECD, Bribery in International
Business Website, http://www.oecd.org/department/0,2688,en_2649_34855 1_1_1 1
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and thus are selective in their investigations and prosecutions.38
Furthermore, if wrongdoing is discovered, the U.S. government
may enter into negotiated settlements with the guilty party if the
violation was a rogue act that did not reflect the corporation's
culture. Where management has a strong compliance program,
the government may prefer not to prosecute and may negotiate
ways to strengthen internal corporate controls.
U.S. courts have ruled that the FCPA does not provide a
private cause of action.3 4 The statute does not explicitly include
a right of action for parties to sue a violating company for civil
damages. And courts have held that the legislative history does
not indicate Congress's intent to create one.35 The House of
Representatives' version of the FCPA included a private right of
action,3 '6 and the SEC General Counsel opined shortly after its
enactment that the FCPA did imply a private right of action. 7
Nonetheless, courts do not recognize a direct private right of
action today. Several scholars contend, however, that the statute
would be much more effective if Congress were to amend the
statute to include a direct private right of action. 8
1,00.html (last visited May 4, 2006); Scientific Applications International Corporation,
FCPA Training Website, http://www.saic.com/employees/fcpa.html (last visited May 4,
2006); U.S. Agency for International Programs Website, http://www.usaid.gov/our_
work/democracy-and-governance/technica-areas/anticorruption (last visited May 4,
2006).
33. See Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, Principles of Federal Prosecu-
tion of Business Organizations (Jan. 20, 2003). TimothyJ. Coleman, Esq., Senior Counsel
to the Deputy Attorney General, made available a copy of the memorandum at the
Annual Meeting of the Association of Corporate Counsel held in Chicago on October
25, 2004. According to the Thompson Memo, the decision whether to prosecute an
organization, which often occurs in conjunction with the prosecution of individuals,
depends on a corporation's culture, the operation of its regulatory compliance pro-
gram, and how quickly management informs the appropriate government authorities of
possible violations of law. If management waits until the conclusion of an investigation,
it may have waited too long.
34. See, e.g., Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 1086 (1991); see also Citicorp Int'l Trading Co. v. Western Oil & Refining Co.,
771 F. Supp. 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
35. See, e.g., Lamb, 915 F.2d at 1024-25.
36. See id. at 1025.
37. Opinion of the General Counsel on the Existence of a Private Right of Action
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 81,071, at 80,806 (Sept. 6, 1976).
38. See Daniel Pines, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a Private
Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 185 (1994); see also Brett Witter, Lamb v. Phillip Morris,
Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990): The Sixth Circuit Gets Sheepish on Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act Enforcement, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW 533 (1992).
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There is little doubt that there would be greater enforce-
ment, and concomitant deterrent effect, if Congress amended
the FCPA to include a direct private right of action. Such con-
gressional action is desirable, although it is not likely to occur in
the near term. Despite the lack of an explicit right of action,
however, some corporations, with the assistance of resourceful
plaintiff's counsel, have utilized FCPA violations as bases for civil
damage suits. 39
B. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions
Although OECD Member States adopted the OECD Con-
vention in 1977, it did not enter into force until February 15,
1999.40 This twenty-two year exercise in delay provides some
window into governments' incentives to investigate and crimi-
nally prosecute their own Nations' bribes to foreign government
officials. The Convention has only seventeen articles.4" Under
its terms, OECD Member States oblige themselves to adopt do-
mestic legislation prohibiting the payment of bribes to foreign
officials to obtain or maintain business.42
The OECD Member States have not adopted identical im-
plementing legislation. One frequent criticism of the Conven-
tion is that its Article 3 merely requires Member States to treat
the bribery of foreign officials in the same manner as it deals
39. See infra notes 71-101.
40. See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1992, 337 I.L.M. 8 [hereinafter OECD Conven-
tion].
41. The headings of the articles are: (1) The Offence of Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials, (2) Responsibility of Legal Persons, (3) Sanctions, (4) Jurisdiction, (5) En-
forcement, (6) Statute of Limitations, (7) Money Laundering, (8) Accounting, (9) Mu-
tual Legal Assistance, (10) Extradition, (11) Responsible Authorities (12) Monitoring
and Follow-up, (13) Signature and Accession, (14) Ratification and Depositary, (15)
Entry into Force, (16) Amendment, and (17) Withdrawal. See id. arts. 1-17. They pro-
vide that the penalty for bribing a foreign official may be civil or criminal, including a
fine or imprisonment, so long as punishment is proportionate to the offense. The arti-
cle on enforcement consists of two sentences. The first affirmed the right of each state
to enact its own laws in accordance with its own system-that is, the method for imple-
mentation need not be uniform. The second sentence provides that the parties "shall
not be influenced by considerations of national economic interest, the potential effect
upon relations with another State or the identity of the natural or legal persons in-
volved." Id. art. 5.
42. See OECD Convention, supra note 40, art. 1.
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with bribery of domestic officials, but does not impose a uniform
standard.4" Thus, widely varying sanctions exist among OECD
countries. This has led some to conclude that national sanctions
for illegal bribes do not have a strong deterrent effect." From a
"black letter" law standpoint, however, the OECD Convention
leveled the playing field for U.S. multinational corporations and
citizens.
The Convention's effectiveness relies in large part on the
OECD Working Groups' activities. The Working Groups moni-
tor the Convention's implementation. Their members include
experts from each of the Member States. The monitoring sys-
tem is divided into two phases. Phase One consists of an analysis
of whether the relevant country's implementation is in conform-
ity with the obligations established by the Convention. Phase
Two requires a series of meetings with representatives of "gov-
ernment, law enforcement, businesses, trade unions and civil so-
ciety" in the course of a week-long site visit.45 The Working
Groups issue reports of the results of their fact-finding and rec-
ommendations.46 The Working Groups are largely dependent
on information provided by the Member States. They lack the
power to compel OECD Member States to provide documents,
and they can only encourage cooperation, which depends on the
good faith of foreign government officials. These Working
Groups lack any real enforcement power under the Convention.
Rather, OECD Member State compliance relies largely on public
disapprobation and fear of retaliation by other countries.4 7
Transparency International sees progress through the
OECD process. It notes that there is now significant foreign
43. See id. art. 3.
44. See, e.g., David L. Heifetz, Japan's Implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Conven-
tion: Weaker and Less Effective than the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 11 PAC. RIM L. &
POL'v 209 (2002) (noting that the Japanese crime of bribing a foreign public official is
weaker than what the OECD Convention mandates).
45. OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business Transactions,
http://www.oecd.org/document/5/0,2340,en_2649_34859_35430021_11_11,00.
html (last visited May 4, 2006) (describing the OECD Working Groups).
46. Because one week is too short a period for information collection, there may
need to be a permanent Working Group presence in each OECD member state to
monitor activities.
47. See Harold Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599,
2635 (1997) (book review) (noting that "efficiency, national interest, and regime
norms" are more likely to result in Nation States complying with treaties than a treaty
enforcement mechanism).
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bribery enforcement in over one-third of the thirty-one coun-
tries covered by the OECD Convention in 2006. This is an in-
crease over 2005;48 but in a progress report, Transparency Inter-
national notes that "it is essential to build additional momentum
for enforcement. This requires a strong monitoring pro-
gramme. Unless this is done, there is serious danger that the
Convention could fail."
49
Daniel K. Tarullo, one of the lead negotiators for the
United States on the OECD Convention, contends that the Con-
vention has failed to establish the uniform, mandatory, and en-
forceable requirements needed to combat bribery in interna-
tional transactions.5 0 Noting that there have been extremely few
prosecutions by OECD Member States, Professor Tarullo con-
tends that "[t]he obvious explanation for the lack of prosecu-
tions is that OECD members lack either the will or the capacity
to meet their obligations. There are other, more benign expla-
nations, though none is particularly convincing. '' 51 Professor
Tarullo rejects the idea that the Convention 52 is having a signifi-
cant deterrent effect based on information from Transparency
International's Bribe Payers Index.
53
48. See HEIMANN & DELL, supra note 6, at 3.
49. Id.
50. Daniel K. Tarullo, The Limits of Institutional Design: Implementing the OECD Anti-
Bribery Convention, 44 VA. J. IN-r'L L. 665, 666-89 (2004). During the Clinton Administra-
tion, Mr. Tarullo participated in OECD Convention negotiations as Assistant Secretary
of State for Economic and Business Affairs from 1993 to 1996, and then as Assistant to
the President for International Economic Policy.
51. Id. at 683.
52. The effectiveness of internal controls and anticorruption legislation vary, as do
attitudes within a corporation. In a letter written in 2002, Transparency International's
founder Dr. Peter Eigen noted that corporate awareness about the need to comply with
the Convention was low:
In fact, the situation is much worse because only one in five managers in
emerging market countries is even aware of the [C]onvention and these are
the managers at the front line where bribery takes place. Only 19 per cent of
respondents in the Transparency International (TI) [B]ribe [P]ayer['s] sur-
vey, conducted for TI by Gallup International between December 2001 and
March 2002, were familiar with or knew something about the [C]onvention.
Peter Eigen, Letter to the Editors, Anti-Bribery Convention Needs Support, FIN. TIMES, Oct.
17, 2002, at 20. While corporate awareness and knowledge of the consequences for
violations have increased, it is impossible to know whether this has resulted in a reduc-
tion of overall corruption in the intervening years.
53. Tarullo, supra note 50, at 684. Transparency International's Bribe Payers In-
dex offers a useful gauge of corruption throughout the world. While other organiza-
tions and individuals have examined corruption on a comparative basis, none have
been as successful as Transparency International in raising public awareness of corrup-
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While acknowledging that it is more difficult to identify
OECD violations than those of other international agreements,
given the nature of corruption by government officials, Professor
Tarullo observes:
[A] potential "violation" of the OECD Convention is not easy
to discern. Bribery takes place in the shadows. It may never
be visible to anyone but the immediate actors. Where there
are hints of bribery, investigations backed with some form of
compulsory process may be necessary to establish the case
that a signatory is obliged to take action. Finally, even if there
is information available about a specific, possibly illicit pay-
ment, a prosecutor may have good reasons for declining to
prosecute the case: insufficient evidence to meet a criminal
conviction standard of proof, potential cost of the prosecu-
tion relative to other enforcement priorities, etc. It may not
be an easy matter to distinguish instances of good faith non-
prosecution from instances where prosecutors have ignored
overseas bribery in order to boost the competitive position of
their country's firms. In short, while the United States and
other advocates of the Convention are well aware that the
Convention is not being rigorously implemented, they have
difficulty identifying specific instances of non-implementa-
tion (i.e., non-prosecution) in a convincing manner.54
In sum, the OECD Convention puts peer pressure on gov-
ernments to enforce national anticorruption laws and to make
needed changes in their national regimes. Based on OECD
Working Group Reports, however, Transparency International
points out that "[t]here are significant deficiencies in the en-
forcement systems of 2/3 of the countries covered. 55
tion and its consequences. See Transparency International 2006 Bribe Payers Index,
http://www.transparency.org/newsroom/in-focus/2006/bpi-2006 (last visited May 4,
2006) (providing overview of Transparency International's work in this area).
54. Tarullo, supra note 50, at 689. Professor Tarullo identifies three approaches to
enhance OECD Member State governments' willingness to uphold their treaty obliga-
tions:
(1) Reduce the payoff for a government tolerating overseas bribery by credibly
threatening additional costs on that government; (2) Increase the payoff for a
government's prosecuting overseas bribery by credibly promising rewards to
that government; and (3) Change the agents within other governments who
make the assessment of their governments' payoff structure.
Id. at 690-91; see also Hugh Williamson, Export Credit Agencies' Graft Crackdown Stalls, FIN.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2006, at 8 (noting that Germany and Japan prevented stronger anticor-
ruption controls for companies with official credit agency financing).
55. HEIMANN & DELL, supra note 6, at 3.
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C. Council of Europe Criminal Law and Civil Law
Conventions on Corruption
On January 27, 1999, the COE adopted the Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption.5 6 Parties to this Convention agreed
to criminalize various acts of corruption. Among the items the
signatories agreed to criminalize were the promise, offer, or giv-
ing of bribes to, and the solicitation or receipt of bribes from
domestic public officials, members of domestic public assem-
blies, foreign public officials, members of foreign public assem-
blies, international organization officials, members of interna-
tional parliamentary assemblies, international judges, and per-
sons engaged in business in the private sector.
The COE adopted the Civil Law Convention on Corruption
in 2003. The Explanatory Report of this Convention states that
combating corruption cannot rely exclusively on criminal law.
The COE Criminal Law Convention on Corruption covers crimi-
nal activity in both the public and private sectors (principally
bribery, "trading in influence," and money laundering) and en-
visioned signatory State prosecution of violators under domestic
criminal law adopted to implement the Convention. Signifi-
cantly, the subsequently adopted COE Civil Law Convention
obliged signatories to adopt measures that would give persons
who had suffered damages the right to obtain compensation-
that is, it obliged signatories to create a private cause of action
against the person who committed the corrput acts.5 The Civil
Law Convention addresses:
56. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 15; see also COE, Ex-
planatory Report to the Criminal Law Convention on Convention, http://conven-
tions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Reports/Html/ 173.htm (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
57. See Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 15, arts. 9, 12-13; see
also Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note 15. The relevant language provid-
ing that COE Member States must create the legal basis to compensate victims of cor-
ruption is as follows:
Chapter I-Measures to be taken at national level
Article 1-Purpose
Each Party shall provide in its internal law for effective remedies for persons
who have suffered damage as a result of acts of corruption, to enable them to
defend their rights and interests, including the possibility of obtaining com-
pensation for damage.
Article 2-Definition of corruption
For the purpose of this Convention, "corruption" means requesting, offering,
giving or accepting, directly or indirectly, a bribe or any other undue advan-
tage or prospect thereof, which distorts the proper performance of any duty or
[Vol. 30:45
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- accessibility and effectiveness of civil law remedies;
- main potential victims of corrupt behaviors;
- evidence and proof of the causal link between acts and
damage;
- illicit payments and their relation to competition;
- validity of contracts;
- the role of auditors;
- "whistleblower" protection of employees;
- procedures, including litigation costs, and international co-
operation.
5 8
The COE established the Group of States Against Corruption
("GRECO") 59 to function as a monitoring group similar to the
Working Groups under the OECD Convention. Its personnel
rely on the use of questionnaires and site visits to monitor com-
pliance with the Convention.6 ° While there is not a significant
track record of civil actions on which to assess its importance in
practice, it does afford victims of corruption new remedies.6 1
Transparency International produced an evaluative report
of GRECO's activities pursuant to the COE conventions on cor-
behaviour required of the recipient of the bribe, the undue advantage or the
prospect thereof.
Article 3-Compensation for damage
1. Each Party shall provide in its internal law for persons who have suffered
damage as a result of corruption to have the right to initiate an action in order
to obtain full compensation for such damage.
2. Such compensation may cover material damage, loss of profits and non-
pecuniary loss.
Article 4-Liability
1. Each Party shall provide in its internal law for the following conditions to be
fulfilled in order for the damage to be compensated:
i. the defendant has committed or authorised the act of corruption, or failed
to take reasonable steps to prevent the act of corruption;
ii. the plaintiff has suffered damage; and
iii. there is a causal link between the act of corruption and the damage.
2. Each Party shall provide in its internal law that, if several defendants are
liable for damage for the same corrupt activity, they shall be jointly and sever-
ally liable.
Id. arts. 1-4.
58. U.S. Mission to the European Union, Fact Sheet, Nov. 11, 2000, http://www.
useu.be/ISSUES/convl0111.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).
59. See COE, Explanatory Report to the Civil Law Convention on Corruption, supra note
56, 92.
60. Id. 92-94.
61. See Bruce Zagaris, Anticorruption Conventions Provide for Remedies to Victims, Int'l
L. News (ABA Sec. of Int'l L., Washington D.C.) Summer 2006, at 21.
60 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 30:45
ruption and other instruments ("TI Report"). 6 2 The TI Report
gave a generally favorable assessment.6
D. United Nations Convention Against Corruption
In 2005, the first truly global anticorruption convention en-
tered into force after thirty countries ratified it. Over 140 coun-
tries have now signed it, including the United States.64 The U.N.
62. See FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, REPORT OF TI STUDY ON FOLLOW-UP PRO-
CESS FOR UN CONVENTION AGAINST CORRUPTION (2006), www.transparency-usa.org/doc-
uments/UNCACReportFina6-13-06.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2006).




- Strong secretariat with high level of professionalism.
- GRECO plenary with strong chairman meets 3 - 5 times annually.
- EU accession requirements for Central European countries provided an
effective lever.
- Associated technical assistance.
Methodology
- Well designed questionnaires.
- Well organized country visits.
- A compliance process which follows up on the implementation of the
recommendations made in the evaluation process.
- Some civil society participation.
- Scrupulous equal treatment of all countries and willingness to recom-
mend improvements.
- Systematic audit with wide coverage.
- Review produces detailed reports with recommendations.
Transparency
- Publishes explanations of review process, schedule and questionnaires.
- Evaluation and compliance reports are always published, subject how-
ever to agreement of country reviewed.
Weaknesses
There has been criticism of GRECO on the following grounds:
- Too much focus on formal provisions, insufficient focus on some ques-
tions of real impact.
- Country visits are largely officials with evaluated countries not always
providing the civil servants with the best information.
- Civil society participation could be strengthened, is not required in the
rules, but has become standard part of country reviews.
- Agreement of countries required for publication of reports.
Id.
64. A list of States that have ratified the U.N. Convention is available at http://
www.unodc.org/tnodc/crime-signatures-corruption.html (accessed July 20, 2006).
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee unanimously consented to ratify the
Convention on August 1, 2006, and the full Senate ratified it on September 15, 2006.
See 152 CONG. REC. S9662-63; see also U.S. Senate, Treaties Approved by the United
States Senate During the Current Congress, http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/legisla-
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Convention contains four parts: (1) preventive measures; (2)
criminalization and law enforcement; (3) asset recovery; and (4)
international cooperation and monitoring. The framework on
asset recovery, meant in large part to help developing countries
to retrieve bribes and other illegally procured assets deposited in
developed countries' banks by corrupt officials, is considered
"groundbreaking."6 5 The first meeting of the Conference of
State Parties ("Conference") will be in December 2006; it is criti-
cal that the Conference create a monitoring system.
The U.N. Convention contains seventy-one articles and may
come to play a significant role in international anticorruption
efforts. Article 34, Consequences of Acts of Corruption, requires
States to annul or rescind contracts awarded as a result of cor-
ruption. Article 35 requires the parties to adopt measures to
compensate victims of corruption. In order to reach agreement,
Member States failed to define corruption, in part because con-
duct considered illegal in one country might be legal in an-
other.66
Thus, the U.N. Convention, the COE Civil Law Convention
on Corruption, and the OECD Convention support private rem-
edies for the effects of bribery. Because the OECD Convention
is specific to international bribery and because it has a well-estab-
lished monitoring mechanism, it currently is seen as the most
significant of the three Conventions in practice.
III. THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS
Existing anti-bribery statutes and norms provide the basis
for civil lawsuits for damages. Private corporations that do not
engage in bribery have the greatest incentives to see that their
bids succeed on the merits. MDBs have incentives to ensure that
their donor nations' funds are not misappropriated. And NGOs
exist to monitor and advocate in the anticorruption effort.
These non-State actors are likely to be increasingly important in
enforcement.
tive/one itemandteasers/trty_rtf.htm (last visited October 23, 2006). For a cynical
view of the convention, see Burger, supra note 11.
65. WORLD BANK, supra note 3, at 181.
66. See Burger, supra note 11.
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A. Private Legal Entities
Corporations that have strict policies against paying bribes
or engaging in other forms of corruption have the greatest stake
that large-scale international tenders be conducted without
bribes. Such corporations are the principal beneficiaries of a sys-
tem where winners are determined on the merits. It is these cor-
porations that must seek civil damages when corrupt competi-
tors harm their corporate interests.
67
As countries more fully implement their obligations under
the Conventions, private companies are likely to be able to de-
fend their interests more aggressively through civil lawsuits. This
is particularly the case where there has been a change in the
ruling government in which the corrupt activity occurred.
Where the stakes are high enough, a private multinational cor-
poration may make a decision to pursue legal action where a
State prosecutor would not. Furthermore, although the legisla-
tion in some jurisdictions may preclude certain claims under the
Convention, such as unfair competition, antitrust, or anti-mo-
nopoly legislation, other corruption-related claims may be via-
ble.
Professor Tarullo is skeptical that companies that lost busi-
ness as a result of a competitor's bribe would sue.6" He argues
that such companies may have paid bribes themselves, they may
be reluctant to take actions that might affect their future busi-
ness opportunities in the country, and they may face even
greater difficulty than a government in gathering evidence.69
While these concerns are significant, companies have incentives
to sue and in fact are doing so. Over time, some government
67. Numerous scholars have noted that governments have long deputized private
persons to assist in law enforcement functions in certain instances. In particular, attor-
neys have sometimes been assigned gatekeeper roles. See Fred Zacharias, Lauyers as
Gatekeepers, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1387, 1397-1402 (2004) (noting that altering the role
of lawyers and advocates has far-reaching implications for the attorney-client relation-
ship).
68. Tarullo, supra note 50, at 670-71.
69. Bribery can take many forms, such as kickbacks for purchasing agents or spe-
cial treatment by customs or other governmental officials. The latter are called "grease
payments," which are payments given to government officials to get them to perform
non-discretionary tasks that by law or custom they are required to do, such as register a
car. See Rebecca Koch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It's Time to Cut Back the Grease and
Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 379 (2005) (arguing that the interpre-
tation of grease payments is not narrowly enough drawn).
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officials and employees of the tender winner leave their posi-
tions. These individuals may provide evidence or testimony, and
their risks of doing so are less once they are no longer employed
by the government or bribe-paying company. Furthermore,
some corporations may be willing to "write-off' doing business in
one country if they have sufficient business opportunities in
other countries. In other words, they do not fear "closing the
door" on a particular country by revealing corrupt officials in
that country through a lawsuit. This is particularly true of small
and medium size companies that are incapable of accomplishing
numerous projects simultaneously. They may bid on numerous
tenders with the expectation of winning only a small percentage
of them. For some such companies, seeking damages through a
legal process arising from bribery might be quite profitable.
In the past, the only remedy against corrupt competitors
would have to be in the country where the corruption took place
and where the domestic government and courts are unlikely to
overturn a tender outcome. The winning bidder's country is not
likely to prosecute the case for both legitimate and illegitimate
reasons.7" But today there are litigation options outside the
country where the bribe took place.
1. Civil Law Claims Brought in the U.S. Involving
Bribery Abroad
The right of civil action provides a useful complement to
criminal proceedings as a deterrent. U.S. courts have recog-
nized the legitimacy of these claims. These cases show that cor-
porate victims of international corruption can and will sue to
remedy their damages. Outlined below are several lawsuits in
U.S. courts for civil damages as a result of international bribes.
U.S. and non-U.S. claimants have brought cases against U.S.
competitors in tenders abroad, against foreign nationals in the
U.S. who allegedly arranged bribes in foreign transactions, and
against foreign corporation with ties to the United States. It is
striking that even without direct statutory support, such as a pri-
vate right of action under the FCPA, plaintiffs have brought via-
ble claims. Surely not all have been able to prove causation:
that "but for" the corrupt act, they would have won the interna-
tional contract at issue. These cases, however, demonstrate the
70. See Ouzounov, supra note 14, at 1189-94.
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kinds of cases that are likely to become more common, resulting
from changing anticorruption norms and practices.
a. Environmental Tectonics v. WS. Kirkpatrick, Inc.
Environmental Tectonics Corporation, International
("ETC"), a Pennsylvania corporation, was a competitor against
Kirkpatrick, a New Jersey corporation, for a major construction
contract on a Nigerian air force base.7 1 ETC, the plaintiff, lost
the bid but learned that a New Jersey corporation had paid
bribes to Nigerian government officials and won the tender.
Plaintiff brought defendant's corrupt acts to the attention of the
U.S. and Nigerian governments.72 The DOJ prosecuted Kirkpat-
rick and its Chief Executive Officer under the FCPA; both
pleaded guilty.7" Based on that judgment, the plaintiff sought
damages under a variety of federal and state laws and the de-
fendants moved to dismiss, claiming the Act of State doctrine in
defense.74
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit wrote:
The nature of the acts alleged and the number of victims are
... important considerations in this analysis. ETC claims to
have suffered direct economic injury from the appellees'
scheme. By illegally influencing the decisions of appellees'
public officials, however, appellees have also created an even
larger class of victims, the citizens of Nigeria. Moreover, be-
cause bribery of foreign officials by American businessmen di-
minishes this nation's stature and influence abroad, conduct
of the kind here alleged victimizes the citizens of this nation
as well.75
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and unanimously affirmed
the Third Circuit's decision that the defendants' Act of State de-
fense had no merit as no foreign sovereign act was at issue.76
ETC had stated viable claims for damages against a corrupt com-
petitor that had paid bribes abroad.
71. See Envfl. Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d 1052, 1054-56 (3d Cir.
1988).
72. See id. at 1056.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1054, 1056.
75. See id. at 1063-64 (internal quotations omitted).
76. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp., 439 U.S. 400 (1990).
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b. Dooley v. United Technologies Corp.
An employee of Sikorsky Aircraft, a subsidiary of United
Technologies Corp. ("UTC"), filed an action against his em-
ployer alleging that UTC was engaged in a bribery scheme in
which UTC bribed Saudi Arabian officials to win contracts for
the sale of its helicopters to the Saudi Arabian government.77
The employee alleged that the conspiracy developed through
tacit agreements between high-level UTC executives and the
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States, Prince Bandar
bin Sultan.7 The district court found no lack of jurisdiction
over any of the corporate or individual defendants, although sev-
eral were foreign entities or individuals.7 9 The plaintiff alleged
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO"),so and supplemental state law claims."'
c. Rotec Industries, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp.
Here, Rotec Industries, an Illinois corporation that manu-
factures concrete equipment, sued Mitsubishi and C.S. Johnson,
a U.S. corporation, for damages that resulted from alleged cor-
rupt actions in an international competition in China to build
the Three Gorges Dam on the Yangtze River." Rotec alleged
that defendants had bribed certain members of the Bid Evalua-
tion Committee and that for that reason alone, Rotec had lost
the construction competition. 3 Rotec alleged violations of fed-
eral antitrust and racketeering laws and of the Oregon tort law
prohibiting intentional interference with economic relations.84
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's analysis that the tort claim was a valid cause of
action but that the plaintiff had failed to allege facts that could
prove that defendants' acts had caused it economic harm. 5 The
Ninth Circuit, in evaluating defendants' summary judgment mo-
77. See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 786 F.Supp. 65, 69 (D.D.C. 1992).
78. See id.
79. See id. at 82.
80. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68
(2000).
81. See Dooley, 786 F.Supp. at 68.
82. See Rotec Indus., Inc. v. Mitsubishi Corp., 348 F.3d 1116, 1118 (9th Cir. 2003)
83. See id. at 1122.
84. See id. at 1119.
85. See id. at 1122-23.
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tion, assumed that bribes were given, but concluded that "too
many inferences need to be drawn to establish a connection be-
tween that improper conduct and Rotec's ultimate failure to se-
cure the two contracts won by the defendants. '8 6 Although
Rotec did not prevail, its claims as a victim of international cor-
ruption were recognized as valid under state tort law.
d. Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
In Korea Supply Company v. Lockheed Martin, the Republic of
Korea solicited bids for certain military equipment. 87 Korea Sup-
ply Company ("KSC") represented the Canadian company Mac-
Donald Detwiler and Associates Ltd. ("MacDonald"). 88 KSC ac-
ted as MacDonald's agent in the bidding and negotiation pro-
cess, and Loral, a California-based subsidiary of Lockheed
Martin Corp., was the other party submitting a bid. Under its
contract, if MacDonald had the winning bid, KSC would receive
a $30,000,000 commission. 89 The Korean Government declared
Loral to be the winning bidder, even though MacDonald's bid
was $50,000,000 lower and its equipment was superior.9 ° The
Korean Ministry of Defense justified its decision to choose Loral
by asserting that the U.S. government was less likely to share in-
telligence information with Korea if the contract was awarded to
a Canadian company.91 Whether true or not, the Korean De-
fense Intelligence Command's project management office con-
ceded that the MacDonald equipment was less expensive than
that offered by Loral and was also technologically superior.92
KSC filed suit in California, alleging that Loral had violated
California's unfair competition law and the tort of interference
with prospective economic advantage.93 KSC alleged that Loral
paid $10,000,000 to an intermediary, Ms. Kim, to arrange that
persons working for the Korean Ministry of Defense receive
86. See id. at 1122.
87. See Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 63 P.3d 937, 94142 (Cal.
2003).
88. See id. For a discussion of Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin in light of U.S.
FCPA requirements, see Justin Serafini, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 41 AM. C~iM. L. REv.
721 (2004).
89. See Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 941-42.
90. See id. at 942.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 941-42.
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bribes and sexual favors.94 Not surprisingly, the situation grew
into a major public scandal. KSC alleged in its complaint that
"[i]n securing the contract by wrongful means, Loral acted with
full knowledge of the commission relationship between [KSC]
and [MacDonald] and knowing that its interference with the
award of the contract would cause [KSC] severe loss."9 Further-
more, KSC contended that Lockheed Martin was the beneficiary
of the illegal Loral-Kim conduct and to that extent had been
unjustly enriched.96
The California Supreme Court's decision ultimately turned
on the particular language of the California unfair competition
statute that precluded KSC from obtaining damages when it did
not have an ownership interest. It also rejected a request for
restitution because KSC's expectancy of payment was not justici-
able; the money it would have received would originate from the
Korean Government, not Loral.97
But the California Supreme Court did find that KSC was en-
titled to damages based on the common law claim of intentional
interference with prospective economic advantage. 98 After ex-
amining the facts and the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 766B,99 the Court noted the importance of the FCPA to the
present case:
94. See id. at 942.
95. Id.
96. See id. The Korea Supply Company ("KSC") originally asserted three causes of
action: (1) conspiracy to interfere with prospective advantage, (2) intentional interfer-
ence of KSC's relationship with MacDonald Detwiler and Associates Ltd. ("MacDon-
ald"), and (3) unfair competition under California state law.
97. See id. at 947-50.
98. The Court stated:
[The] elements are usually stated as follows: (1) an economic relationship be-
tween the plaintiff and some third party, with the probability of future eco-
nomic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowledge of the relation-
ship; (3) intentional acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the
relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm
to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.
Id. at 950 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
99. Section 766B reads:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with another's prospective
contractual relation (except a contract to marry) is subject to liability to the
other for pecuniary harm resulting from loss of the benefits of the relation,
whether the interference consists of (a) inducing or otherwise causing a third
person not to enter into or continue a prospective relation or (b) preventing
the other from acquiring or continuing the prospective relation.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979).
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Here, KSC has clearly satisfied the independent wrongfulness
requirement. In its complaint, KSC alleged that defendant
Kim, as an agent for Loral, engaged in bribery and offered
sexual favors to key Korean officials in order to obtain the
contract from the Republic of Korea. Under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, it is unlawful to pay or offer money or
anything of value to a foreign official for the purposes of in-
fluencing any act or decision of the foreign official, or to in-
duce the foreign official to use his or her influence with a
foreign government to affect or influence any act or decision
of the government. In addition, the complaint alleges that
the commissions paid by Loral to Kim exceeded the maxi-
mum allowable amounts established by the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. The complaint thus clearly alleges that defend-
ants engaged in unlawful behavior in order to secure the...
contract. KSC has, therefore, sufficiently alleged that defend-
ants' acts, in addition to interfering with KSC's business ex-
pectancy, were wrongful in and of themselves.
100
KSC was able to assemble the necessary evidence, perhaps
through private investigators, reporters, or tips from Korean
Government officials or Loral employees.
KSC had an incentive to find out why its client did not get
the contract, and it then proceeded to seek a legal remedy. The
KSC case was possible because it could prove that its client had
made the superior bid and there was no issue of standing. There
was no doubt that but for the illegal conduct, MacDonald would
have won the tender.' 0l
100. Korea Supply Co., 63 P.3d at 954 (citations omitted).
101. Korea is a party to the Convention and has its own legislation implementing
its obligations, yet KSC chose to bring its claims in California rather than Korea. That
decision may be based on an assessment of political factors or the court systems that
arguably would have jurisdiction over the case. Such an evaluation would need to take
into account the time it would take to have the case heard and the appeal process
completed, the risk that a court's decision might be on the basis of something other
than the merits (e.g., corruption, political interference by the government of the al-
leged bribe payer and the government where the bribe was paid), or the possibility of
developing a case (e.g., access to witnesses and documents of both the opposing and
third parties). See Christopher K. Carlberg, A Truly Level Playing Field for International
Business: Improving the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery Using Clear Standards, 26
B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 95, 102-11 (2003) (criticizing the Convention's enforcement
and calling for the unification of rules concerning statute of limitations (e.g., 5 years)
and sanction (not less than $175,000)).
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2. The German Civil Right of Action
German law provides a private right of action for parties in-
jured by bribe-paying corporations. In its formal submission to
the OECD, Germany stated that:
At present, German law does not provide for specific "civil
sanctions" against persons who are subject to criminal sanc-
tions in respect of the bribery of a foreign public official.
However, Germany draws attention to section 826 of the Ger-
man Civil Code, which provides for damages where a person
intentionally injures another in such a way as to breach public
morals, and states that section 826 should apply to intentional
bribery of a foreign public official. 10 2
Germany's interpretation of the OECD Convention goes beyond
the U.S. FCPA and finds that plaintiffs may obtain damages
when they have been injured by another party's intentional
bribe of an official. Further, Germany's submission to the
OECD clarifies that the investigation and prosecution of bribery
of a foreign public official "shall not be influenced by considera-
tion of national economic interests, the potential effect upon re-
lations with another state or the identity of the natural or legal
person involved." 10 3 In other words, the government undertakes
to treat such bribery in a criminal context, not a diplomatic one.
Germany's private right of action against corrupt practices is
important in itself and as a model for other National civil law
legislation within the OECD and in Europe. Germany's private
right of action against bribery of foreign officials is likely to lead
to such a right of action in other OECD and COE nations, as
required under the COE Civil Law Convention on Corruption
and the OECD Convention. Whether all the civil law countries
take the same approach as Germany remains to be seen.
B. Multilateral Development Banks
MDBs are in a position to play a key role in the fight against
certain forms of corruption. They provide funds and technical
assistance to the public sector and civil society to increase moni-
toring systems for public contracts and allocate funding through
102. Germany's Review of Implementation of the Convention and 1997 Recom-
mendation to the OECD § 3.7, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/14/1/2386529.pdf
(last visited May 4, 2006).
103. Id. at 10.
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tenders held pursuant to formal procedures. Such procedures
are usually better structured than domestic legislation and are
more likely to achieve higher transparency and to facilitate fair
evaluation of competitive bids.
MDBs finance some of the largest global development
projects. These banks include the Asian Development Bank,1 4
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, °5 the
Inter-American Development Bank, 10 6 and the World Bank (and
its component parts).1°7 Increasingly, MDBs have focused on
the problem of corruption, rule of law, and their impact on de-
velopment. MDBs are concerned about compliance by third
parties in projects they finance and anticorruption efforts within
the banks themselves. According to the World Bank's website:
The Bank has identified corruption as among the greatest ob-
stacles to economic and social development. It undermines
development by distorting the rule of law and weakening the
institutional foundation on which economic growth depends.
The harmful effects of corruption are especially severe on the
104. See Asian Development Bank Governance Website, http://www.adb.org/Gov-
ernance/default.asp (last visited May 4, 2006); Asian Development Bank Law and Policy
Reform Website, http://www.adb.org/Law/default.asp (last visited May 4, 2006).
105. See European Bank for Reconstruction and Development Website, http://
www.ebrd.org/oppor/procure/guide/fraud/index.htm (last visited May 4, 2006) (ex-
amining procurement fraud and corruption).
106. See Inter-American Development Bank ("IADB") Website, http://www.iadb.
org/news/articledetail.cfm?Language=En&parid=3&artType=AN&artid=2834 (last vis-
ited May 4, 2006) (discussing its policy of zero tolerance towards corruption). For ex-
ample, the IADB assisted U.S. law enforcement officials in the prosecution of a former
employee who has since pleaded guilty to wire fraud involving the Bank's resources.
LADB uncovered the criminal conduct and referred the matter to U.S. law enforcement
authorities.
107. See World Bank Anti-Corruption Website, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSI
TE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPUBLICSECTORANDGOVERNANCE/EXTANTICOR
RUPTION/0,,menuPK-384461-pagePK 149018-piPK 149093-theSitePK-384455,00.
html (last visited May 4, 2006) [hereinafter Anti-Corruption WAebsite] (examining cor-
ruption); see also WORLD BANK DEVELOPMENT COMMITTEE, STRENGTHENING BANK ENGAGE-
MENT ON GOVERNANCE AND ANTICORRUPTION (2006), http://www.worldbank.org/html/
extdr/comments/govemancefeedback/gacpaper.pdf (last visited Sept. 8, 2006) (me-
morializing Word Bank's policy on governance and anti-corruption). There is much to
commend in this document. It evinces an appreciation of the interplay between cor-
ruption and development. It recognizes the importance of greater transparency with
respect to the Bank's operations. It seeks to better coordinate activities both within the
bank and other development banks as well as organizations like the OECD. Unfortu-
nately, the document contains some troubling provisions. For example, it maintains a
country-focused approach, rather than a people-focused approach, and it does not treat
acts of bribery by corporations as severely as might be expected.
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poor, who are hardest hit by economic decline, are most reli-
ant on the provision of public services, and are least capable
of paying the extra costs associated with bribery, fraud, and
the misappropriation of economic privileges. Corruption
sabotages policies and programs that aim to reduce poverty,
so attacking corruption is critical to the achievement of the
Bank's overarching mission of poverty reduction.
[The Bank] believe[s] that an effective anticorruption strat-
egy builds on five key elements:
1. Increasing Political Accountability
2. Strengthening Civil Society Participation
3. Creating a Competitive Private Sector
4. Institutional Restraints on Power
5. Improving Public Sector Management
.... Since 1996, the World Bank has supported more than
600 anticorruption programs and governance initiatives de-
veloped by its member countries.
10 8
But despite these programs and declaratory policy, corruption
problems persist at the World Bank. °9
MDBs do not necessarily have the same interests as the gov-
ernments to which they make loans. MDBs and donor countries
to MDBs have incentives to see that projects are awarded solely
on the merits. Also, since large project financing deals are com-
pleted over many years, the institutional personnel will not re-
main the same throughout the relevant time frame. This turno-
ver of personnel creates opportunities for whistleblowers. Simi-
108. World Bank Anti-Corruption Website, supra note 91.
109. See Parthapratim Chanda, The Effectiveness of the World Bank's Anticorruption Ef-
forts: Current Legal and Structural Obstacles and Uncertainties, 32 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
315, 316 (2004). According to Mr. Chanda, corruption at the World Bank continues to
be a problem. For example, he stated the following:
Disbursing over $19 billion in loans per annum, the World Bank is exposed to
significant operational risk for corruption and fraud. For example, Northwest-
ern University political economist Jeffrey Winters estimates that corruption di-
verted upwards of 30 percent of development funds lent to Indonesia by the
World Bank, totaling over $11 billion. Several high-profile cases involving
multinational Western firms in World Bank financed projects confirm the
transnational nature of such corruption. In 2000, for example, the World
Bank suspended its support for a $100 million water project in Ghana awarded
to a unit of Enron Corporation, citing an unexplained $5 million payment by
Enron.
Id. (citations omitted). Mr. Chanda identifies the Bank's own administrative rules in
coordination with local law enforcement as factors that hinder the effective anticorrup-
tion measures. See id. at 319-53.
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larly, the fact that MDB staffs are multinational provides a
margin of protection against corruption. Given the staff's multi-
ple loyalties to home countries, national companies, and to the
MDB, collusion among staff with particular donee government
officials or with particular contractors for corrupt purposes is
less likely than in more homogeneous environments. 11
C. Non-Governmental Organizations
NGOs are the principal entities that critique the govern-
ment monitoring process under the OECD Convention.1 '
NGO monitoring work provides extremely valuable background
information for potential civil damage claims. NGOs provide in-
formation on country conditions and anonymous assessments of
the level of corruption in particular environments. They are also
able to assist whistleblowers and private corporations in the fight
against corruption.
Transparency International, probably the leading anticor-
ruption NGO, not only provides neutral information on percep-
tions of corruption in individual counties, it also monitors com-
pliance with the OECD Convention. It is stating clearly that gov-
ernment enforcement practices are insufficient. Its work, and
that of other NGOs, is invaluable in creating greater awareness
of the depth and breadth of corruption.
D. The Development of a Plaintiffs Bar
We are not aware that a plaintiff's bar yet exists for bringing
civil claims for bribery, but its development seems desirable and
likely. Private actions against corrupt competitors in interna-
tional commerce are likely to increase as the world's economy
110. Some multilateral development banks ("MDBs") observers note that the MDB
role in international financing is decreasing. Private banks increasingly encroach on
projects that MDBs have traditionally financed in recent years. Because private sector
institutions are often more entrepreneurial than inter-governmental institutions, there
is reason to believe that MDBs may play a decreasing role in large international projects
in the future.
111. See Isabella D. Bunn, Global Advocacy for Corporate Accountability: Transatlantic
Perspectives From The NGO Community, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 1265, 1278-80 (2004). On
non-governmental organization ("NGO") accountability, see Robert Charles Blitz, Who
Will Watch the Watchdogs? Human Rights Nongovernmental Organizations and the Case for
Regulation, 10 BuFF. HUM. RATS. L. REv. 261 (2004). Although Blitz focuses on account-
ability and quality control in human rights monitoring, these characteristics are also
needed for monitoring efforts to combat corruption.
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becomes ever more integrated and as anticorruption norms be-
come more accepted. A specialized plaintiff's bar would have
expertise in the domestic law claims that have been most effec-
tive in winning damages and in whistleblower protection laws.
Lawyers in the anticorruption area would likely have close work-
ing relationships with investigatory firms, given the extremely
difficult nature of establishing causation in these cases. These
lawyers would probably work on a contingency basis and be
outside the major law firms that represent large corporate clients
that would be potential defendants.
In situations where there are a number of losing bidders, it
might be possible for all the losing bidders that made a tender
offer to assert that they all have standing until such point that it
is proven that a particular plaintiff had no possibility of being
declared the winner. This strategy would permit plaintiffs to
share the costs of bringing such cases. Aggregating plaintiffs in
this way is not implausible. According to the Financial Times, last
year British Petroleum fired over 200 employees for wrongdoing,
including bribery. 112 One can only guess whether, but for the
actions of such employees, other companies would have won cer-
tain international tender offers.
An aggressive plaintiff's bar could help deter international
bribery by raising the costs of corrupt acts. If corporate actors
contemplating bribery faced a credible threat of civil litigation,
with its concomitant costs of bad publicity, management distrac-
tion, legal fees, and possible adverse judgment, they might think
twice.
CONCLUSION
Private actors, rather than governmental ones, are in a posi-
tion to lead the next stage of the global fight against corruption.
International conventions recognize private claims for damages
from corrupt acts and plaintiffs are bringing civil suits. MDBs
and corporations should start to bring more civil actions when
they have suffered from the corrupt acts of others. Monitoring
bodies should start to devote more attention to civil law enforce-
ment. Attorneys in private practice should start to consider this
112. SeeJames Boxell & Fiona Harvey, BP Sacked 252 in Corruption Drive, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 12, 2005, at 22.
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as a promising field. There is an opportunity for corporations to
begin to police their own in the next stage in the global fight
against corruption.
